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Abstract: The problem of low domestic savings is inherent in most Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
countries. This has motivated most of the SADC countries to institute policies that seek to attract foreign capital to cover the 
investment deficit that arises from low domestic savings rates. In separating individual tax incentives mainly used in the 
SADC region, this study gives a robust analysis on the impact of each tax incentive on FDI inflows into SADC countries. 
The tax incentives used in this study are: tax holidays, corporate income tax (CIT), reduced CIT in specific sectors and losses 
carried forward. The study, in consultation with data from the period 2004 to 2013 separates the SADC countries into four 
panels based on resource richness. Panel 1 includes the resources-rich countries, Panel 2 the resources-poor countries, Panel 3 
all SADC countries, except South Africa and Panel 4 all the SADC countries. The study adopts a system Generalised Method 
of Moments (SYS GMM) methodology to address the problem of endogeneity associated with dynamic panel data models. 
The estimated results established that tax holidays positively explain FDI inflows in Panel 2. CIT was found to negatively 
affect FDI inflows into all SADC countries despite their particular category of resource-richness. Losses carried forward are 
insignificant in all panels and reduced CIT in specific sectors negatively influences FDI inflows in Panel 1 and surprisingly 
positively influences FDI inflows in Panel 2. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic growth and development is a goal pursued by all African countries. However, realisation of 
growth and development remains a dream if there are no meaningful investments in an economy. Sub-
Saharan Africa has a problem of low savings projected to be 18% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2005, due to low incomes which create perennial deficits of investment funds. (World Bank, 2004) 
Therefore all regions in Africa, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) rely 
heavily on foreign capital to cover the investment-savings gap and ensure sustainable growth and 
development in their economies. 
Lack of investment in a country creates socio-economic problems mainly centred on unemployment 
and poverty. These two socio-economic problems have existed in Africa and indeed in the SADC 
since time immemorial. Akrami (2008) advised that, given the nature of capital that is required by 
developing countries to efficiently and effectively utilise the natural resources they have, it is 
important for them to source foreign capital.  
There are two broad types of foreign investments that are crucial to developing countries to ensure 
growth and development: portfolio or indirect investment and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Portfolio investment involves the purchase of a stake in an enterprise by a foreign equity investor. FDI 
is the acquisition and control of the productive operations of a firm in a foreign country (Muradzikwa, 
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2002). Both investment types have received attention from policy makers. However the most 
dominant investment type in the SADC is FDI which involves fixed capital formation due to 
dominance of the natural resources sectors in the region. Therefore, the focus of this paper will be on 
FDI. 
Tax incentives have various definitions; Bolnick (2004) defines tax incentives as fiscal measures used 
by governments to attract investment domestically and internationally in certain key sectors of the 
economy. Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002) defines tax incentives in statutory and effective terms in which 
a special tax provision is granted to qualifying investment projects and this provision would not be 
applied to other investment projects outside the selected qualifying categories. 
There are quite a number of empirical studies on the effectiveness of tax incentive in attracting FDI. 
Tiebout (1956) in Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2005) conclude that the effectiveness of tax incentives in 
attracting FDI depends on the tax incentives and public goods provision mix in the host nation. 
Typically FDI location favours nations with the highest public goods provision and lowest tax burden 
mix. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001) notes that 
governments employ taxation for various political and policy objectives and this are very similar 
across many economies. Tax incentives fall in the broad category of governments tax systems, thus 
they are expected to achieve similar objectives, apart from attracting internationally mobile capital. 
Developing countries offer tax incentives for a variety of reasons, chief amongst them being to counter 
the negative effects of a bad tax system and to achieve a common regional economic development. 
(Holland & Vann 1998) The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI is a highly debatable 
issue with a number of studies finding non-tax factors more effective than tax incentives (Onyeiwu & 
Shrestha, 2005, Bolnick, 2004; Sudsawasd, 2008), and others view fiscal incentives as central to FDI 
attraction. (Hassett & Hubbard, 2002; Sato, 2012) 
Chai and Goyal (2008) in a study to compare the benefits and the costs of tax concessions reckon that 
the cost of tax incentives is larger than the benefits. They used data from small island states in the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. By comparing the costs of tax concessions they concluded that the 
region needed to move away from using tax concessions since they were found to be costly. Šimović 
and Žaja (2010) performed a review of tax incentives used in Western Balkan countries, that is, in 
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The survey-based study concluded 
that like other transitional economies, the Western Balkan countries use tax incentives in under 
developed regions to attract investment and to develop the regions. Using the firm-level data from 30 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, Kinda (2014) revealed that infrastructure, human capital, and 
institutions, are influential in attracting FDI and taxes are not. Taxes were found to be ineffective in 
attracting both vertical FDI and horizontal FDI. In a panel of 35 Central and East European countries, 
Bellak and Leibrecht (2005) found that corporate tax rates were lowered in the region in a quest to 
attract international capital. The study revealed that the semi-elasticity tax rates on capital movement 
between trading countries was -2.93. This shows that lowering tax rates has been successful in 
attracting FDI in the region.  
Therefore, these evidences show that there is no solid conclusion on the effectiveness of tax incentives 
and these can be attributed to the differences in the structure of these economies.  It is against this 
background, that this study seeks to probe the importance of independent fiscal policy decisions taken 
by the SADC member states with their different resource endowments, in implementing tax incentives 
for improving their economies’ attractiveness to FDI inflows. 
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Given the profound changes in the economic, social and political environment in the SADC region, 
the traditional areas of cooperation such as tax harmonisation take on a totally new dimension. The 
need to establish the nature of contribution tax incentives have, in bringing the much needed FDI is 
important in the tax design strategies of SADC economies. Many developing countries actively use tax 
incentives as a foreign capital attraction policy and therefore, tax cooperation in the SADC might be 
the best route to ensure the region’s competitiveness as an investment destination given the integration 
efforts of countries in the region. (Robinson, 2005; Klemm & Van Parys, 2009) 
In this study the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting foreign direct investment into SADC is 
investigated using panel econometric estimation method. To provide robust conclusions on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives, SADC countries are separated into four groups according to resource 
richness, thereby bringing together those countries with similar characteristics. The tax incentives are 
captured as tax holidays, corporate income tax (CIT), reduced CIT in specific sectors and losses 
carried forward. Each of the estimated models in this study, use individual tax incentives variables to 
avoid the effects of collinearity between different tax incentives variables and to improve the 
predictive power of the panel data models. 
The results suggest that, generally tax incentives have significant mixed effects on FDI attraction in 
the four different panels of the study. CIT was found to have a significantly negative effect on net FDI 
inflows into all four panels of the study. Therefore, increasing CIT in the SADC hinders FDI inflows. 
Tax holidays had mixed results in all four panels. In the resources-poorer SADC countries, increasing 
tax holidays attracts more foreign capital while in the resources-rich countries of SADC, tax holidays 
discourage investors from investing in the region. Losses carried forward are insignificant but 
positively signed in most of the panels and indicating that FDI in the SADC prefers longer losses 
carried forward. Reduced CIT shows that increasing taxes in specific sectors affects overall FDI 
inflows in the SADC. But in the resources-poorer countries reduced CIT significantly explained 
positive FDI inflows into the SADC.  
Section 2 which follow presents theoretical framework, methodology and data analysis, while Section 
3 analyses the empirical results from the estimations performed in the study. Section 4 concludes the 
study and proffer policy recommendations. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Data Analysis 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of FDI inflows in developing and developed 
countries points to policy and non-policy factors. (Mateev, 2008) Policy variables are those that the 
government can influence directly such as: tax incentives, labour market regulations, trade policies, 
and infrastructure and governance policies. Non-policy variables are market size, political and 
economic stability and natural resource endowments. 
The study on factors that influence the locational decisions of MNEs using panel data has attracted 
various methodologies based on different theoretical underpinnings. The most prominent models are 
the gravity and Dunning’s (1993) OLI models. (Mateev, 2008) 
The theoretical model adopted in this study is the eclectic paradigm initiated by Dunning. (1979, 
1993) The model offers a conceptual framework for micro and macro level factors that influence an 
investor’s decision on the final investment destination. (Anyanwu, 2011) The model suggests that 
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firms invest abroad based on three types of advantages: ownership (O), location (L) and internalisation 
(I) thus it is also called the OLI paradigm. 
The ownership advantage entails that a firm investing in a foreign market expects to compete with 
local firms in taking advantage of its peculiar benefits such as patent rights, expertise and intangible 
assets. The ownership advantage inspires the investors to exploit foreign markets and resources, 
overcoming the competitive disadvantage they face from local firms who enjoy better market 
knowledge. (Dunning & Lundan, 2008) 
The locational advantages are those attributes the host nations have that makes it more attractive to 
investors than other destinations. (Anyanwu, 2011) The locational advantages include the 
macroeconomic environment of the host nation, government policies that enhance ease of doing 
business in an economy and the protection of property rights.  
Internalisation arises from exploitation of international market imperfections by reducing uncertainties 
and transaction costs. (Anyanwu, 2011) Internalisation of costs generates knowledge efficiently there-
by reducing government created costs such as exchange controls, trade tariffs and taxes.  
In combining the tenets of this OLI theory Fedderke and Romm (2006) identify policy and non-policy 
factors that determine the locational decisions of MNCs. Policy factors are identified as those that 
governments can influence such as: tax rates, tax incentives, trade barriers, infrastructure, openness, 
product regulation and labour market regulations. Non-policy factors are identified amongst other 
factors, as: market size, and political and economic stability. 
Dunning (1988) concludes that the locational advantages in FDI motivation determines where 
production must take place and is of paramount importance in this study. The locational advantages 
identify the peculiar characteristics of a location which makes it attractive such as: natural resources, 
market size, infrastructure, governance, legislation that support FDI, tax policies, exchange control 
policies, patent rights laws and licencing legislation. 
Against this theoretical background, the study specifies the following theoretical models: 
Model A 
),,,,inf,,,( EPfinGopennatrrmrktgovholfFDI                                  (1) 
Model B 
),,,,inf,,,( EPfinGopennatrrmrktgovCITfFDI                                (2) 
Model C 
),,,,inf,,,( EPfinGopennatrrmrktgovLossescffFDI                         (3) 
Model D 
),,,,inf,,,(Re EPfinGopennatrrmrktgovdcdCITfFDI                      (4) 
Where FDI  is the net FDI flows as a % of GDP, hol  are tax holidays, CIT is corporate income tax, 
lossescf are losses carried forward, redcdCIT is reduced CIT in specific sectors, gov is the level of 
governance, mrkt represents market potential (proxy by GDP), infr is infrastructure index, natr are 
natural resource endowments (proxy by total natural resources rents as a % of GDP), open is trade 
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openness (proxy by trade as a % of GDP), finG is financial globalisation and EP is an index for 
economic policy
1
. 
Since tax incentive variables are highly correlated, for example, some of the incentives such as lower 
CIT, losses carried forward and investment allowances; they may be part of the package which falls 
under tax holidays. Therefore, the effects of each tax incentive are estimated in independent models. 
Model A will estimate tax holidays, model B - CIT, model C - losses carried forward and model D 
will estimate reduced CIT in specific sectors. 
2.2. Econometric Methodology 
The study estimates four panel data equations for each model, Panel 1 has the six highest resource-rich 
SADC countries according to the World Bank natural resource indicators, Panel 2 includes seven least 
resource-rich countries, Panel 3 consists of all the SADC countries except South Africa (which is an 
outlier in resource richness and growth) and Panel 4 includes all the SADC countries. 
2.2.1. System GMM Estimation  
This study’s panels have a small number of years (2004-2013), therefore efficient estimators are found 
using the Blundell and Bond (1998) SYS GMM estimator. Baltagi (2005) reports that there is a need 
to utilise the initial conditions in generating efficient estimators when using dynamic panel data 
estimation, given the small time series in the data. The estimation of dynamic panel data models, 
specified below in equations A-D, poses two major challenges using macroeconomic data. (Okodua, 
2011) The first one is the existence of endogenous and predetermined covariates. Which means that, 
there is a problem of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in dynamic panel data models due to the 
use of lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable.  
Due to the complicated nature of tax laws especially the complicated nature of formulating and 
implementing statutes, there is difficulty in changing tax laws. Thus tax rates and laws run for a long 
period before they are changed. Current tax law affect investment decisions and portfolio choice in an 
economy. This may in turn affect future tax law formulation which leads to dynamic endogeneity in 
the data. Thus, the observed cross-sectional differences in the countries’ data are due to unobserved 
heterogeneity and country tax law history. Efficient estimators must therefore cater for country 
endogeneity to produce accurate estimators, hence the choice of the SYS GMM method.  
Endogeneity in panel data analysis is solved by the choice of SYS GMM Estimator. (Okodua, 2011) 
Thus to estimate the relationship between tax incentives and FDI the study employs the SYS GMM 
Estimator to overcome the endogeneity problem. 
The models took the form: 
Model A  
itti
itiit
EP
finGInopenInnatrInrmrktgovInholFDIFDI



 
7
6543211, ___inf_                (5) 
Model B 
itti
itiit
EPfinGIn
openInnatrInrmrktgovInCITInFDIFDI



 
76
543211,
_
__inf__
     (6) 
                                                     
1 See data analysis section for detail explanation on how some of the variables are derived. 
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Model C 
itti
itiit
EPfinGIn
openInnatrInrmrktgovInlossescfInFDIFDI



 
76
543211,
_
__inf__
                (7) 
Model D 
itti
itiit
EPfinGIn
openInnatrInrmrktgovInredcdCITFDIFDI



 
76
543211,
_
__inf_
               (8) 
Where i captures country-specific effects that are time-invariant, t  captures year-specific effects 
and it  is the disturbance term, with i  denoting countries (cross-country dimension), and t denoting 
years (time-series dimension). 
Therefore, the estimations follow the leads of Blundell and Bond (1998) SYS GMM estimator: the 
autoregressive panel data model is specified as: 
2..................................................1
'
2
'
11
'
2
'
11
'
ititititititit YYXXFDIFDI     
Where- Ni ,........,1  and  Tt ....,,.........2 . In the model it  is decomposed into unobservable 
individual specific effects so that itiit   + t  where iti    + t   is the usual fixed effects 
decomposition of the error term.  
2.3. Data Analysis  
The data used in this study has been obtained from World Bank Databank; African development 
indicators, Ernst &Young’s global tax data and Worldwide Governance Indicators. The data covers 
thirteen SADC countries over the period 2004 to 2013. The study chose this time period since the 
recent tax incentive data from Ernst & Young captures this period. The data is derived from individual 
country tax statutes and from reports which recorded consistent and similar tax structures for SADC 
countries. All data is expressed in natural logarithms
1
 except for data with negative values. 
Tax incentive data is not readily available since it is contained in statutory instruments which are not 
standardised. (Klemm & Van Parys, 2009) Therefore, in defining variables the study standardised the 
data and established a trend of how each tax incentive was applied in each year throughout the study 
period.
2
 Given the constraint in obtaining some data directly from the above sources, the following 
provides a detailed explanation of how some variables used in the study are generated: 
2.3.1. Tax Holidays  
To measure tax holidays the study follows the lead of Klemm and Van Parys (2009) in using the 
maximum tax holiday given to investors in the economy in a given year. The length of a tax holiday is 
important in attracting FDI as longer holidays ensure longer periods of a lighter tax burden on the 
investor.  
                                                     
1 Log transformation of the data in time series data analysis is important to stabilise the variance. However because there are 
no logarithms for negative values log transformation of data with negative values will cause loss of data points. 
2 The study measures individual tax incentives to help policy makers in choosing the actual tax incentives to use in FDI 
attraction. This adds to literature on SADC countries (see Calitz, 2013) and Bolnick (2004) that have used METR and AETR 
which lumps all tax incentives together and fails to separate each tax incentive’s contribution to FDI attraction.  
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Tax holidays are derived from various tax relief measures given to investors. They are predominantly 
found under corporate tax rates. The study uses the maximum period offered to an investor as tax 
relief in a given year; it could be a full exemption, reduced rates or other allowances offered by the 
country.  
The study chose the longest tax holidays offered in a year because tax holidays indicate how much an 
economy is willing to accommodate foreign capital. Thus, a country that offers tax holidays in its 
strategic sectors is probably going to offer incentives in other sectors since most economic sectors 
have linkages. 
2.3.2. Corporate Income Tax Rate (CIT) 
The statutory CIT rate was used as a measure for this variable. Shrestha and Onyeiwu (2005) conclude 
that the CIT rate measures the extent to which corporations are taxed and measures tax on income, 
profits and capital gains. A low CIT rate is expected to attract and retain foreign investment as it 
increases returns. 
There are various rates of corporate taxes recorded in the Ernst & Young’s worldwide corporate tax 
guides offered in different sectors. This study used the ordinary industrial tax rate as it is the rate that 
covers more sectors and has a bigger influence in determining investment decisions.  
2.3.3. Losses Carried Forward 
The variable is recorded as relief for losses in the Ernst & Young’s worldwide corporate tax guides. It 
measures the number of years a company is allowed to carry forward tax losses.  
In cases where multiple rates exist in different sectors, the study used the least carried forward years 
used in the manufacturing sector. For the sake of consistency in this study, where the carried forward 
years are unlimited, it has declared 10 to be the maximum number of years for the claim to be valid.  
2.3.4. Reduced CIT in Specific Sectors 
The lowest tax rate offered to specific sectors was used to measure this variable. This follows the lead 
of Klemm et al. (2009) in measuring investment allowances which are similar to reduced CIT in 
specific sectors. 
This variable is derived from the tax rate offered in different sectors and the lowest rate offered in the 
sectors covered by this study. This shows how an economy treats strategic sectors which it wants to 
grow for the benefit of the whole economy. This measure is used as a proxy to indicate how the policy 
makers treat strategic sectors. 
2.3.5. Governance 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Matstruzzi (2010) discuss the origin of the worldwide governance indicators 
(WGI) that have been adopted in this study. In 1996, the WGI (which embraces 200 countries and 
measures six governance indicators) was initiated. The indicators are: Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. (Kaufmann et al., 2010) The six indicators are important in 
ensuring ease of doing business and are thus likely to affect the investor’s decision to invest in a 
location. The data is obtained from 31 different data sources including governance perceptions by 
survey respondances, non-governmental organisations, commercial business information providers, 
and public sector organisations worldwide. 
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Kaufmann et al. (2010) define ―governance‖ as ―the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them.‖ These processes, if they are implemented positively in a country, give 
investors property rights and security in their investments and thus attract further investment. 
Following the lead of Akanbi (2015) the study measures governance in a broad sense by averaging the 
six measure in the WGI.  
2.3.6. Infrastructure 
Measuring infrastructure is multi-dimensional with availability and quality of the infrastructure being 
important to growth. (Calderón & Servén 2010) Most studies on determinants of FDI have captured a 
single dimension measure of infrastructure, mainly the availability measure proxied by telephone lines 
per 100 people in the country. The availability of telephone lines indicates a good road network and 
information delivery through internet services since they are related in their operations.  
The study’s efforts in seeking robust conclusions on the factors that determine investors’ locational 
decisions in the SADC, adopts the Calderón and Servén (2010) principal component analysis (PCA). 
This measure produces a synthesis index which captures both the quality and quantity dimensions of 
infrastructure measurement. The index built from the analysis combines information from the three 
basic infrastructure measures: telecommunication, power and roads. (Calderón & Servén, 2010) This 
removes the problem of multicollinearity in using the variables separately in the model. 
This method (also adopted by Akanbi (2015) develops a model for the study that measures both the 
quality and quantity of infrastructure. The model will construct an infrastructure model for the SADC 
using the  PCA method. Following the lead of Akanbi (2013), the study will represent infrastructure 
stock through a composite index, the physical infrastructure index (PII). Calderón and Servén (2004) 
state that the stock of physical infrastructure varies across nations based on demographic and 
geographic factors. 
The PCA process involves converting high-dimension groups of indicators into new indices that 
incorporate information on a different dimension which makes them mutually uncorrelated. Due to the 
unavailability of data, telephone lines per 100 people is used to proxy road networks. Internet user per 
100 people shows the effectiveness of telecommunication networks. Electric power consumption 
which measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission, 
distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants is used to measure the 
electricity infrastructure stock.  
The aggregate infrastructure stocks index is derived by using the first eigenvectors from the PCA as 
the weights to establish a linear combination: 
332211 XaXaXaPII   where 21,aa and 3a are eigenvectors from the PCA and 21, XX and 
3X are the three infrastructure stocks. Table A1 in Appendix report the eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
from the PCA. 
2.3.7. Financial Globalisation 
Financial services are important for investment since they provide a medium for access to investment 
funds. FDI thrives in economies that are financially open to foreign players. Financial openness 
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involves reducing capital controls and capital flow restrictions. (Stoianov, 2007) The neoclassical 
theory suggests that financial globalisation encourages the flow of capital from capital rich countries 
to capital poor countries in anticipation of higher returns. (Stoianov, 2007)  
The measure ―financial openness‖ has two important dimensions, the first one is legal or de jure 
factors based on elements that restrict or allow capital flows in and out of an economy. (Stoianov, 
2007) The second set of measures are de facto indicators which show the extent of trade volumes, 
capital flows in the economy and the amount of capital foreigners hold in an economy, accessibility of 
financial services, amongst many others. The two measures are highly correlated; the legal measures 
indicate government policy towards capital flows and the de facto indicators show the results of the 
policy and thus a choice should be made as to which indicators to use. (Stoianov, 2007) 
Financial globalisation is estimated using the de facto measure which looks at access to financial 
services in the economy. The study uses the number of commercial banks per 100, 000 adults in the 
economy, as a measure of financial globalisation. 
2.3.8. Economic Policy 
This study adopts Ojeaga’s (2012) single index measure for economic policy. The government’s 
economic policies are regulations set by government to achieve its economic goals and are thus in 
most cases correlated with each other. Therefore, there is a need for a single index that represents the 
policies, since using one proxy variable normally gives biased estimates. In this study economic policy 
was captured using government consumption expenditure and inflation and a single index was 
developed using principal component anlysis (PCA). Government policies are the various fiscal and 
monetary policies aimed at macroeconomic stability and inflation and government expenditure covers 
these policies effectively. Table A2 in Appendix report the eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the 
PCA for the Economic Policy variable. 
 
3. Empirical Results and Analysis 
3.1. Diagnostic Tests 
Tables A3 to A6 in the Appendix contain diagnostic test results from a system GMM estimation of 
Panels 1 to 4. The estimation results from the four panels were gained from using one-step GMM 
estimation with constants as specified in econometric models A to D. The model also contains 
individual year specific effects. These additional ten-year dummy variables are included to increase 
the instruments and thus improve the efficiency of estimates. (Stoinov, 2007) 
The diagnostic test results analysis begins with the model specification test shown by the F-statistic 
which is highly significant for all four panels at 1% level as shown by the p-values. This indicates that 
the regressors in the four panels jointly explain the significant variation in the FDI inflows across the 
selected SADC countries in each panel.  
The next important estimation test is the post-estimation Sargan test which tests for over-identifying 
restriction in the panels. The Sargan test compares the number of instruments used and the parameters 
in the model. In one-step estimation the Sargan test is considered superior to the alternative Hansen J-
test. (Okodua, 2011) In cases where the model fails the Sargan test it indicates a misspecification 
error. (Chavali, 2014) This is because it minimises the value of the GMM one-step model. The null 
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hypothesis for the Sargan test is that over-identifying restrictions are valid. The Sargan test rejects the 
validity of instruments when the probability p-value is less than 0.05. (Chavali, 2014) 
Thus, the Sargan test in all the four panels using p-values does not reject over identifying restrictions 
since all four panels have p-values above 0.05. The diagnostic result, therefore, concludes that the 
instruments’ over-identification restrictions set in each panel are valid. 
The models used two differenced lags as instruments to address the problem of short time periods and 
small cross-sections in the models. The reported AR (1) and AR (2) tests show p-values above 5% in 
the one-step estimations. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at 5% level of 
significance. Therefore, the instruments are not endogenous and estimates are consistent. 
3.2. Estimated Empirical Models
1
 
The SYS GMM estimations in this section produced interesting results on the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in FDI attraction in the SADC region. Macroeconomic control variables also had 
interesting, and in some cases surprising relationships, with net FDI inflows into the SADC countries. 
The estimations were done using the one-step GMM estimation with constants as specified in 
econometric models A to D in section 3. The estimation results are shown in tables 1 to 4. 
Table 1. Estimated empirical results of the SYS GMM Panel 1 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
FDI (-1) 0.7508288 
(0.000)***   
0.7813831   
(0.000 )***     
0.7313236 
(0.000)***   
0.69201174 
(0.000 )***    
Tax holidays -0.0453303   
    (0.819 )    
  
 
 
Log CIT  -0.32456 
 (0.006)***    
  
Losses Carried  
Forward 
  -6.457257 
(0.259) 
 
Reduced CIT    -0.257379   
    (0.040 )**    
Governance  11.37773 
  (0.076 )*    
 
9.958844 
(0.101)    
 
8.679832 
  (0.029 )**    
 
  5.945349 
  (0.008 )***    
 
Market potential -0.1198403 
(0.262 )    
-0.0899106 
(0.430 )    
-0.1302812 
(0.171)    
-0.1598241 
(0.139)    
Infrastructure -4.434885 
(0.005)*** 
-3.327424 
(0.065)* 
-3.412898 
(0.058)* 
-5.075188 
(0.004)*** 
Log Natural  
Resources 
-1.345016 
(0.000)*** 
-1.36202 
(0.000)*** 
-1.451677 
(0.000)***  
-1.306214 
(0.000)*** 
Log Trade 
Openness 
1.543197 
(0.0056)*** 
1.518772 
(0.010)**  
1.593977 
(0.007)*** 
2.07522 
(0.001)***  
                                                     
1 The models contain a combination of linear-linear and linear-log relationships. For linear-linear relationships a unit change 
in the independent variable leads to a change in the dependent variable which is equal to the coefficient of the independent 
variable. For linear-log models one unit increase of log independent variable leads to a change in the dependent variable by 
the value of the coefficient of the independent variable. Thus a 1% increase in the independent variable changes the 
dependent variable by 0.01 times the coefficient of the independent variable. Since the dependent variable is measured as a % 
of GDP the interpretations of the variables for linear-log models have to consider the variables measurement. 
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Log Financial 
Globalisation 
1.432874 
(0.059)* 
1.451487 
(0.504) 
0.1210353 
(0.962)  
2.471988 
(0.032)** 
Economic  
Policy 
-0.1802605 
(0.517)  
-0.2629364 
(0.085)*  
-0.1752989 
(0.582) 
-0.0794149 
(0.815) 
Yr2004 
 
Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Yr2009 
 
Yr2010  
 
Yr2011 
 
Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.975048 
(0.351) 
7.414866 
(0.000)*** 
6.744843 
(0.009)*** 
3.661675 
(0.110) 
5.672091 
(0.021)** 
3.911199 
(0.109) 
3.742166 
(0.180) 
1.755233 
(0.549) 
-43.01757 
(0.045)** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
2.305721 
(0.284) 
8.235579 
(0.000)*** 
7.225766 
(0.006)*** 
4.453325 
(0.065)* 
6.460128 
(0.012)** 
5.077059 
(0.056)* 
4.859294 
(0.101) 
2.837567 
(0.359) 
-85.97198 
(0.059)* 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.539036 
(0.474) 
7.450592 
(0.000)*** 
6.788771 
(0.009)*** 
3.808071 
(0.100) 
6.190999 
(0.014)** 
4.591577 
(0.069)* 
4.390719 
(0.126) 
2.586305 
(0.396) 
-27.81898 
(0.264) 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.978067 
(0.339) 
7.341992 
(0.000)*** 
5.498714 
(0.034)** 
3.039139 
(0.181) 
4.328481 
(0.083)* 
2.522045 
(0.312) 
2.560895 
(0.361) 
0.5466028 
(0.852) 
-62.53391 
(0.007)*** 
 
Observations 63 63 63 63 
Number of Groups 7 7 7 7 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata 12 output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant at 5% level and 
*indicates significant at 10% level. 
From Table 1, Panel 1, tax holidays in Model A are statistically insignificant, meaning they do not 
explain FDI inflows into resources-rich SADC countries. However, the negative sign on the variable 
indicate that tax holidays give a negative signal about an economy to investors and discourage their 
location in economies that use tax holidays. A 1% increase in tax holidays reduces FDI inflows by 
0.045%. 
CIT is significant at 1% level as shown in Model B and is negatively signed indicating that an increase 
in CIT will lead to reduced FDI inflows to the SADC resources-rich countries. This supports the 
findings of Klemm and van Parys (2009) that lower income tax rates attract more FDI inflow into 
developing countries. Precisely a 1% increase in CIT reduces FDI inflows by 0.325%. Therefore, tax 
holidays are not preferred as much lower CIT in attracting FDI. 
Losses carried forward are insignificantly different from zero as shown in Model C. The insignificant 
values for the variable support the argument that investors are interested in incentives that are long-
term. The variable has a p-value of 0.259 showing that it is insignificantly different from zero. 
Reduced CIT in specific sectors produced interesting results shown in Model D above; the variable 
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has a negative effect at 1% level. Since the study uses the lowest rate offered in specific investment 
sectors in each SADC country to measure this variable, the sign indicates that high tax rates in key 
sectors reduces FDI inflows. Specifically in Panel 1, reduced CIT shows that a 1% reduction in CIT 
will translate into a 0.25% increase in FDI inflows. This supports the neoclassical investment theory 
which argues that low costs attract investment since they enhances profits. 
The lagged FDI variable shows similar results for all four models estimated using Panel 1 countries’ 
data. The variable is significant at 1% and is positively signed in all the models A to D. This indicates 
that the flow of FDI into SADC countries responds to previous year inflows; therefore, most 
investments in the region flow to areas where other investors are established. Thus, most investors use 
the follow-the-leader approach, where new investments are inspired by the performance of earlier 
investors. The results also support the New Economic Geography theory which argues that investment 
flows to the core region where economic activity is already high. This is typically true in developing 
countries where most FDIs are resources-seeking and thus discovery of primary resources by early 
movers attracts new entrants. The effects of previous year FDI inflows in Panel 1 show coefficients 
that are almost equal. In Model A, a 1% increase in previous year FDI inflows increases FDI net 
inflows in the current year by 0.75%. For models B, C and D a 1% increase in previous year FDI 
inflows increases FDI net inflows in the current year by 0.78%, 0.73% and 0.69% respectively. 
The governance index in the model shows the socio-economic status of a country. Panel 1 results for 
models A, C and D show that FDI net inflows are positively related to a stable socio-economic status 
of a country at 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. These results support the findings of 
Akanbi (2013) which conclude that investment spending in a country increases when the socio-
economic environment is good. These results and the magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that the 
institutional stability and effectiveness in the SADC region are important in attracting foreign 
investment.  For instance, in Model A, a one index point increase (improvement) in governance will 
lead to about an 11% increase in FDI inflow to the region. 
Market potential measured by GDP growth rate, is insignificantly different from zero in all the four 
models of Panel 1. This shows that the globalisation wave has removed the effects of market size since 
foreign markets are now easier to access due to technological improvement in information 
communications technology. The SADC countries’ integration has also widened the market for 
investors in the region thus market-seeking FDI to individual countries is insignificant. Though 
insignificant, the market potential variable is surprisingly negative in all four panels. For example, in 
Model A, a 1% increase in market potential reduces FDI inflows by 0.12%. This is contrary to the 
expected positive effect that market potential should have. This might be because of the nature of 
investment in the SADC resource-rich countries which is resources-seeking FDI. Thus, increases in 
the GDP growth rate indicate high incomes for the local nationals which might pose competition for 
foreign capital. High incomes also signal potentially strong pressure groups for indigenous 
participation in sectors that involve natural resources extraction which threatens the existence of 
foreign investment in those sectors. 
The stock of infrastructure variable has interesting results in all four models, which is surprisingly 
negatively signed. The coefficients are significant at 1% level in Models A and D and at 10% in 
models B and C. The coefficients have high values of -4.4 for model A, -3.3 for Model B, -3.4 for 
Model C and -5.1 for Model D. Theoretically, increases in stock of infrastructure is expected to 
positively impact foreign capital. However, the results in Panel 1 for all the models A to D indicate 
that increase in infrastructure negatively affects inward FDI attraction. This conclusion supports the 
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findings of Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) that excessive productive expenditure by 
governments can be unproductive and that developing countries misallocate expenditure in favour of 
capital expenditure at the expense of recurrent expenditure. The negative relationship between 
infrastructure and FDI inflows can also be attributed to poor infrastructure regulatory frameworks. 
Following the recommendations of the World Bank in the 1990s most SADC countries privatised their 
state-owned enterprises in the infrastructural sector which created private companies in the industry. 
This move increased the cost of infrastructure and hence their positive attraction to FDI collapsed. 
Kirkpatrick, Parker and Zhang (2006) conclude that though developments in the commutations sector 
have encouraged competition, the sector has characteristics that allow firms to retain a monopoly 
which might encourage them to exploit their power in pursuit of supernormal profit. 
The log natural resources variable also exhibits interesting results. Panel 1 shows that the natural 
resources variable (measured as natural resources rents as % of a GDP) has a negative relationship 
with FDI inflows and are significant at 1% level in all four models. This indicates that FDI in SADC is 
resources-seeking and when countries impose high royalties in mining and other taxes on foreign 
investment, FDI inflows fall. For instance, in Model B a 1% increase in natural resources rent as a % 
of GDP reduces FDI inflows by 1.36%. 
Trade openness measured as trade % of GDP is significant in all four models of Panel 1. The variable 
is positively signed indicating that openness to trade attracts FDI inflows into SADC resources-rich 
countries. The result supports the theoretical arguments that openness to trade reduces the costs of 
doing business to foreign firms and thus attracts foreign capital. The variable is highly significant at 
1% level in models A, C and D and at 5% in Model B. Model D has the highest coefficient which 
shows that a 1% increase in trade as a % of GDP will lead to an increase in FDI net inflows by 
2.075%. The coefficients for models A, B and C are also high taking values of 1.54; 1.51 and 1.59 
respectively. 
Financial globalisation positively impacts FDI inflows in all four models of Panel 1. However, the 
variable is only significant in models A and D at 10% and 5% levels respectively. Model A shows the 
1% increase in financial globalisation explains a 1.43% increase in net FDI inflows and in Model D, a 
1% increase in financial globalisation accounts for a 2.47% increase in net FDI inflows. The economic 
policy variable is insignificantly different from zero in models A, C and D of Panel 1. It is, however, 
significant at 10% level in Model B and negatively signed. Thus, an increase in inflation and 
government expenditure in the index reduces net FDI inflows into SADC resources-rich countries. A 
1% increase in economic policy index reduces net FDI inflows by 0.26%. 
Table 2. Estimated empirical results of the SYS GMM Panel 2 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
FDI (-1) 0.1817723 
(0.000 )*** 
0.1769628 
(0.000 )*** 
0.1517319 
(0.000)***   
0.1682598 
(0.000 )*** 
Tax holidays 0.0335549 
(0.002)***     
   
Log CIT  -0.02603 
 (0.006)***    
  
Losses Carried  
Forward 
  0.8545623 
(0.690) 
 
Reduced CIT    0.0891729 
(0.093 )*    
 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                                          J A M  v o l .  7 ,  n o .  3 ( 2 0 1 7 )  
 
48 
Governance  -2.617819    
(0.078 )*    
-2.300087 
(0.063 )*    
-3.0867    
(0.164 )    
-1.869469 
(0.085 )*    
Market potential 0.1808723 
(0.016 )**    
0.1805173 
(0.112 )    
0.1913209 
(0.097 )*    
0.1569562 
(0.157)    
Infrastructure -4.638513    
(0.002 )***    
-4.702356 
(0.002 )***    
-4.774561 
(0.002)***    
-4.91995 
(0.001 )***    
Log Natural  
Resources 
-0.8224798 
(0.244)  
-0.9648517 
(0.033)** 
-0.7644326 
(0.252)  
-0.6970618 
(0.274) 
Log Trade 
Openness 
-0.0731741     
(0.978)   
-0.79119 
(0.772)  
-0.3125475     
(0.908)   
-2.5307442 
(0.074)*   
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
3.960395 
(0.039)**    
3.512697 
(0.075)*    
4.154748  
(0.025)**    
3.912717 
(0.033)**    
Economic  
Policy 
0.255267 
(0.427)  
0.1704575 
(0.609)  
0.1703265 
(0.588)  
-0.0887271 
(0.789)  
Yr2004 
 
Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Yr2009 
 
Yr2010  
 
Yr2011 
 
Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
-4.181803 
(0.002)*** 
-2.476348 
(0.031)** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
0.4285573 
(0.702) 
0.0264707 
(0.985) 
-2.684225 
(0.009)*** 
-1.843181 
(0.081)* 
-2.626588 
(0.024)** 
-4.307746 
(0.000)*** 
2.266665 
(0.868) 
Dropped due  
To collinearity 
-4.497011 
(0.001)*** 
-2.685077 
(0.020)** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
0.8141012 
(0.508) 
0.333031 
(0.821) 
-2.384177 
(0.033)** 
-1.447129 
(0.218) 
-2.169428 
(0.109) 
-3.757873 
(0.009)*** 
-0.5028798 
(0.970) 
Dropped due 
To 
collinearity 
-4.460478 
(0.004)*** 
-2.753415 
(0.070)* 
-0.3645437 
(0.807) 
0.3192226 
(0.786) 
Dropped due 
To 
collinearity 
-2.894136 
(0.029)** 
-2.096105 
(0.096)* 
-2.859258 
(0.028)** 
-4.525393 
(0.001)*** 
4.965254 
(0.693) 
Dropped due 
to collinearity 
-1.238662 
(0.313) 
Dropped due 
to collinearity 
2.529052 
(0.023)** 
3.434598 
(0.005)*** 
2.698731 
(0.061)* 
0.5085404 
(0.682) 
1.368191 
(0.287) 
0.3558411 
(0.778) 
-1.3313991 
(0.298) 
-2.531855 
(0.834) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 
Number of Groups 6 6 6 6 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata 12 output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant at 5% level and 
*indicates significant at 10% level. 
Table 19 shows the results from a system GMM estimation of Panel 2 models A to D. The tax 
incentives variables in the panel significantly explain FDI inflows into resources-poor SADC countries 
except losses carried forward. Tax holidays are significant at 1% and are positively signed. The results 
show that a 1% increase in tax holidays leads to an increase of 0.034% in net FDI inflows into SADC 
resources-poorer countries listed in Panel 2. This is in support of the findings by Klemm et al. (2009) 
that in developing countries tax holidays are important in luring foreign capital. Tax holidays in the 
SADC resources-poorer countries reduce costs to the investor thus encouraging investment in less 
attractive sectors. 
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CIT is significant at 1% level and negatively signed. Precisely a 1% increase in CIT reduces net FDI 
inflows by 0.026%. This supports the theory which argues that increases in CIT increase the cost of 
doing business and thus push away investment. This finding is similar to those in Panel 1. Reduced 
CIT in specific sectors, though weakly significant at 10% level, is surprisingly positively signed in 
Panel 2. The results show that increasing taxes in specific sectors increases FDI inflows into 
resources-poorer SADC countries. A 1% increase in least tax rate in specific sectors increase FDI 
inflows by 0.089%. Possibly this is because of the preferential treatment given to specific sectors over 
other sectors; thus in countries with limited resources investors prefer equal treatment in all sectors to 
ensure easier diversification of operations.  
The lagged FDI variable shows similar results for all four models A to D in Panel 2 estimation. The 
variable has a positive effect on net FDI inflows and is significant at 1% level in all four models. The 
variable, however, has lower coefficients than Panel 1 estimations. Thus, the impact of previous year 
FDI inflows has a lower effect in lower-resourced SADC countries than in resources-richer SADC 
countries. In models A, B, C and D a 1% increase in previous year net FDI inflows leads to a 0.18%, 
0.18%, 0.15% and 0.17% increase in current year net FDI inflows in models A, B, C and D 
respectively. 
The governance index is significant in models A, B and D at the 10% level and insignificant in Model 
C. Surprisingly; unlike in Panel 1, in Panel 2 the governance index is negatively signed. In models A, 
B and D a 1 unit increase in governance performance reduces FDI inflows into low-resources SADC 
countries by 2.62%, 2.3% and 1.87% respectively. This could be due to the fact that strong governance 
structures that ensure accountability in operations do not encourage FDI in resource-poor 
environments because they increase the cost of doing business. 
Market potential measured by GDP growth rate is weakly significantly different from zero in models 
A and C of Panel 2 and insignificant in models B and D. Contrary to its effects in Panel 1, estimations 
of the market potential variable has a positive impact on net FDI inflows. Thus, in lower-resourced 
SADC countries market-seeking FDI inflows are significant. Precisely a 1% increase in GDP growth 
rate increases net FDI inflows by 0.18% in Model A and by 0.19% in Model C. This result is expected 
since theory suggests that FDI moves to markets that are stronger and thus can find demand for their 
products. Importantly, this shows that less resources-rich SADC countries attract FDI in sectors other 
than the primary resources sector. 
The stock of infrastructure variable has interesting results in all four models in Panel 2. Just as in 
Panel 1, the results are surprisingly negatively signed. The coefficients are significant at 1% in models 
A to D. A 1% increase in infrastructure stock reduces FDI inflows by 4.64%, 4.70%, 4.77% and 
4.92% in models A to D respectively. This result reinforces those findings in Panel 1. 
The log natural resources variables support the results in Panel 1. The variable is significant at 5% in 
Model B of Panel 2. Thus, Panel 1’s result that taxing natural resources more in SADC countries 
discourages foreign investment is reinforced. Panel 2 Model B shows that a 1% increase in the natural 
resources variable reduces net FDI inflows by 0.96%. 
The trade openness variable in Panel 2 shows a different result to that of Panel 1. The result is 
negatively signed though it is significant in Model D only at 10% level. In Model D a 1% increase in 
the trade openness variable reduces net FDI inflows by 2.53%. This indicates that in resources-poor 
SADC countries, foreign capital is in sectors that require protection against foreign produced products 
entering the market. Thus the SADC resources-poor countries have not improved their economic 
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environments to ensure competitive production of other goods and services outside the primary 
resources sector. 
Financial globalisation significantly impacts positive FDI inflows in all four models of Panel 2 at 5% 
level in models A, C and D, with 10% in Model B. This result complements the findings of Panel 1; 
however, the coefficients in Panel 2 are higher than those in Panel 1. A 1% increase in financial 
globalisation increases net FDI inflows by 3.96%, 3.51%, 4.15% and 3.91% in models A, B, C and D 
respectively. This result suggests that financial development is important to foreign investment in 
other service sectors in the SADC countries with scarce natural resources. 
The economic policy variable is insignificant in all four models of Panel 2. Unlike in Panel 1 the 
variable is positively signed in models A, B and C. This might be because government expenditure 
crowds in FDI inflows and moderate to low inflations do not discourage investment. 
Table 3. Estimated Empirical Results of the SYS GMM Panel 3 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
FDI (-1) 0.9189012 
(0.000)***   
0.892344 
(0.000 )***     
0.9245603 
(0.000)***   
0.9154076 
(0.000 )***     
Tax holidays 0.0780323 
(0.295 ) 
   
Log CIT  -0.721275 
(0.001)***    
  
Losses Carried 
Forward 
  0.9337763 
(0.448) 
 
Reduced CIT    -0.0325512 
(0.394 ) 
Governance  0.4258281 
(0.023)** 
0.8436805 
(0.021)** 
0.7751284 
(0.005)*** 
1.102428 
(0.004)*** 
Market potential -0.0616652 
(0.343) 
-0.02511873 
(0.695) 
-0.056254 
(0.396) 
-0.04884783 
(0.449) 
Infrastructure -1.908309 
(0.034)** 
-1.4194 
(0.000)*** 
-2.172851 
(0.015)** 
-2.196754 
(0.014)** 
Log Natural  
Resources 
-0.5296842  
(0.089)* 
-0.7130618  
(0.039)** 
-0.4579656 
(0.148) 
-0.5793247 
(0.057)*  
Log Trade 
Openness 
-1.083133 
(0.500) 
-0.9571666 
(0.543) 
-0.9074215 
(0.571) 
-0.6550741 
(0.674) 
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
1.542521 
(0.051)* 
0.6371277 
(0.009)*** 
1.967879 
(0.021)** 
1.513586 
(0.072)* 
Economic  
Policy 
-0.1248531 
(0.480)  
-0.1817259 
(0.300)  
-0.1418776 
(0.424)  
-0.1362478 
(0.446)  
Yr2004 
 
Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Yr2009 
 
Yr2010  
Dropped 
due to 
collinearity 
-0.4003894 
(0.778) 
0.2765428 
(0.839) 
3.616528 
(0.009)*** 
1.68104 
(0.152) 
Dropped 
due 
Dropped due to 
collinearity 
-9.248697 
(0.347) 
-8.857821 
(0.364) 
-5.747985 
(0.552) 
-6.92987 
(0.471) 
-8.500497 
(0.367) 
-7.125888 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
-0.585162 
(0.935) 
-0.3687737 
(0.959) 
2.530101 
(0.725) 
0.7324856 
(0.920) 
-0.7294905 
(0.918) 
0.4928031 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.14612 
(0.866) 
1.554275 
(0.820) 
4.414547  
(0.519) 
2.745105 
(0.693) 
1.317356 
(0.845) 
2.388776 
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Yr2011 
 
Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
To 
collinearity 
1.330272 
(0.322) 
2.009716 
(0.128) 
1.731301 
(0.223) 
0.5196761 
(0.732) 
20.29752 
(0.159) 
(0.449) 
-6.924801 
(0.465) 
-7.068726 
(0.452) 
-8.436732 
(0.370) 
-8.436732 
(0.370) 
(0.945) 
0.7924337 
(0.913) 
0.1712367 
(0.981) 
-1.474243 
(0.840) 
-3.12545 
(0.612) 
(0.724) 
2.521793 
(0.714) 
2.1683 
(0.754) 
0.599894 
(0.754) 
24.1454 
(0.986) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 
Number of Groups 12 12 12 12 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant at 5% level and 
*indicates significant at 10% level. 
Table 3 shows the results from a system GMM for Panel 3 models A to D. The tax incentive variables 
indicate that only CIT is statistically different from zero and the other three incentives (tax holidays, 
losses carried forward and reduced CIT in specific sectors) are insignificantly different from zero. Tax 
holidays, however, show a positive sign which supports the findings of Panel 2 that increasing tax 
holidays’ years attracts more foreign capital. 
CIT shows results similar to those in panels 1 and 2 which is a significant negatively signed effect on 
FDI net inflows. Statistically, a 1% increase in the statutory CIT rate will reduce net FDI inflows into 
twelve SADC countries in Panel 3 by 0.72%. This supports the theory and findings in panels 1 and 2 
that FDI into the SADC is attracted by low tax rates which enhance increased profits.  
Losses carried forward are insignificant but positively signed, thus the effect is consistent with 
expected results. This is because FDI faces high set-up costs and thus benefits from losses carried 
forwards in initial years of establishment. The longer the years’ losses can be carried forward for tax 
purposes, the more attractive the destination. 
Reduced CIT unlike in panels 1 and 2 is insignificant but the negative effect is similar to the variable 
impact in Panel 1.  
The lagged FDI variable has similar effects to those in panels 1 and 2 which are highly significant at 
1% level positively signed effect. The positive coefficients in the panel show that previous year FDI 
inflows positively affect current year inflows. The effects have higher coefficients than those in Panel 
2 which shows that the previous year FDI inflows impact the combined SADC countries minus South 
Africa more than they do the resources-poor group. Statistically, a 1% increase in previous year net 
FDI inflows increases current year net FDI inflows by 0.92%, 0.89%, 0.92% and 0.92% in models A, 
B C and D respectively. 
The governance index is significant in all four models of Panel 3, at 5% level in models A and B and 
at 1% in models C and D. Similar to the findings of Panel 1, the variable is positively signed showing 
that SADC countries with high governance scores attract more foreign capital. Thus, in the SADC 
countries forming Panel 3 of the study, FDI favours countries with socio-economic stability. In Panel 
3, a 1 unit increase in governance performance increases net FDI inflows in SADC countries by 
0.43%, 0.84%, 0.78% and 1.1% in models A, B, C and D respectively.  
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Market potential measured by GDP growth rate is insignificantly different from zero in all four models 
of Panel 3. Surprisingly, however, just as in Panel 1 it is negatively signed. This finding is contrary to 
theory suggesting that high incomes discourage foreign capital due to possible competitiveness of 
local businesses (indicated by high incomes). 
The stock of infrastructure variable is significant in all four models of Panel 3 at 5% in models A, C 
and D and at 1% in model B. The coefficients just as in panels 1 and 2, are negatively signed. The 
coefficients indicate that a 1% increase in infrastructure stock explains a reduction in net FDI inflows 
by 1.91%, 1.42%, 2.17% and 2.2% in models A to D respectively. This result reinforces those findings 
in panels 1 and 2. 
The log natural resources variables support the results in panels 1 and 2. The variable is significant in 
models A, B and D at 10%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Thus, the results in panels 1 and 2 
reinforce that taxing natural resources more in SADC countries discourages foreign investment. For 
Panel 3, models A, B, and D show that a 1% increase in the natural resources variable reduces net FDI 
inflows by 0.53%, 0.71%, and 0.58% respectively. 
The trade openness variable in Panel 3 shows that the variable is insignificantly different from zero in 
all four models. The result is negatively signed as in Panel 2. The sign is contrary to theory and means 
that FDI into SADC countries prefers protected economies which are not open to trade.  
Financial globalisation has a significantly positive impact on FDI inflows in all four models of Panel 3 
at 10% level in models A and D, 1% in model B and at 5% in model C. This result complements the 
findings of panels 1 and 2. A 1% increase in financial globalisation increases net FDI inflows by 
1.54%, 0.64%, 1.97% and 1.51% in models A, B, C and D respectively. This result suggests that 
financial development is important to foreign investment in the SADC. 
The economic policy variable is insignificant in all four models of Panel 3. Similar to Panel 1, the 
variable is negatively signed in all the models. This is because government expenditure crowds out 
foreign investment and inflation levels in the SADC are too high which affects business viability. 
Table 4. Estimated Empirical Results of the SYS GMM Panel 4 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
FDI (-1) 0.9119658 
(0.000)***  
0.8842055   
(0.000 )***  
0.9181124 
(0.000)***  
0.9045428 
(0.000 )*** 
Tax holidays -0.1001436  
(0.155 )    
     
 
 
Log CIT  -0.0452 
(0.009)*** 
  
Losses Carried 
Forward 
  0.9052408 
(0.449) 
 
Reduced CIT    -0.0099738  
(0.784)  
Governance  0.2175242 
(0.087 )*    
0.4763533 
(0.554)   
0.1638223 
(0.031 )**  
0.4213011 
(0.046 )**    
Market potential -0.0474351  
(0.454)  
-0.0087058  
(0.889)  
-0.0456667  
(0.479)  
-0.03126  
(0.618)  
Infrastructure -0.685311 
(0.068)*     
-0.3688582     
(0.054)*     
-0.7936212     
(0.060)*     
-0.5234846     
(0.002)***     
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Log Natural  
Resources 
-0.3291234 
(0.227)  
-0.6035176 
(0.057)* 
-0.2077596 
(0.426)  
-0.2305557 
(0.384) 
Log Trade 
Openness 
-1.351099   
(0.382 ) 
-1.012735    
(0.501)  
-1.145398    
(0.449)  
-0.7036566   
(0.640)  
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
0.8308491 
(0.031)**     
-0.2300842 
(0.767)     
1.217181    
(0.018)**     
0.5815253 
(0.012)**     
Economic  
Policy 
-0.1307242 
(0.443)  
-0.202619 
(0.231)  
-0.1486099 
(0.385)  
-0.1582274 
(0.359)  
Yr2004 
 
Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Yr2009 
 
Yr2010  
 
Yr2011 
 
Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
Dropped due  
To collinearity 
5.899724 
(0.371) 
5.750351 
(0.384) 
8.675983 
(0.192) 
7.226081 
(0.283) 
5.622282 
(0.283) 
6.714986 
(0.303) 
7.121997 
(0.283) 
6.91114 
(0.298) 
5.61058 
(0.401) 
5.64238 
(0.465) 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
-11.64383 
(0.230) 
-11.52865 
(0.231) 
-8.280672 
(0.386) 
-9.163584 
(0.335) 
-10.6495 
(0.252) 
-9.487239 
(0.306) 
-9.229978 
(0.323) 
-8.97133 
(0.332) 
-10.15462 
(0.273) 
-4.13543 
(0.564) 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.954367 
(0.773) 
1.719719 
(0.800) 
4.835564 
(0.479) 
3.304517 
(0.632) 
1.80938 
(0.787) 
2.762216 
(0.682) 
3.203507 
(0.640) 
2.947802 
(0.667) 
1.608993 
(0.815) 
0.064523 
(0.456) 
Dropped due  
to collinearity 
2.825582 
(0.665) 
2.719137 
(0.679) 
5.655541 
(0.390) 
4.348277 
(0.515) 
2.961434 
(0.646) 
3.885741 
(0.547) 
4.050767 
(0.538) 
4.083123 
(0.535) 
2.779936 
(0.675) 
2.468545 
(0.956) 
 
Observations 117 117 117 117 
Number of Groups 13 13 13 13 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata 12 output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant at 5% level and 
*indicates significant at 10% level. 
Table 4 shows the results from a system GMM for Panel 4 models A to D. The tax incentive variables 
indicate that only CIT is statistically different from zero and the other three incentives (tax holidays, 
losses carried forward and reduced CIT in specific sectors) are insignificantly different from zero. Tax 
holidays surprisingly show a negative effect contrary to the panel 2 and 3 estimations but similar to 
Panel 1. The possible reason for this is the addition of South Africa in Panel 4 which adds to the 
number of SADC countries that have abolished tax holidays. This negative effect is thus a 
consequence of that South Africa being the highest recipient of FDI inflows in the SADC. 
CIT shows results similar to those in panels 1, 2 and 3 which is a significant negatively signed effect 
on FDI net inflows. Statistically, a 1% increase in the statutory CIT rate will reduce net FDI inflows 
into thirteen SADC countries in Panel 4 by 0.05%. This supports theory and findings in panels 1, 2 
and 3 that FDI into the SADC is attracted by low tax rates which enhance increased profits. The 
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coefficient in Panel 4 is smaller than that in Panel 3, showing that adding South Africa to the model in 
Panel 3 reduces the effects of CIT. This is because South Africa is moving away from using tax 
incentives as an FDI attraction strategy. 
Losses carried forward are insignificant but positively signed as in earlier panels, thus the effect is 
consistent with expected results. This is because FDI faces high set-up costs and thus benefits from 
losses carried forward in the initial years of establishment and the longer the years’ losses can be 
carried forward for tax purposes, the more attractive the destination. 
Reduced CIT in Panel 4 is insignificant and negatively signed. The negative effect supports theory that 
low taxes attract more investments. 
The lagged FDI variable has similar effects to those in panels 1, 2 and 3 which is a highly significant 
at 1% level positively signed effect. The positive coefficients in the panel show that previous year FDI 
inflows positively affect current year inflows. Statistically, a 1% increase in previous year net FDI 
inflows increases current year net FDI inflows by 0.91%, 0.88%, 0.92% and 0.90% in models A, B, C 
and D respectively. 
The governance index is significant in models A, C and D of Panel 4 at 5% level in models C and D 
and at 10% in models A. Similar to the findings of panels 1 and 3, the variable is positively signed 
showing that SADC countries with high governance scores attract more foreign capital. Thus, the 
thirteen SADC countries forming Panel 4 of the study show that FDI favours countries with high 
socio-economic stability. In Panel 4, a 1 unit increase in governance performance increases net FDI 
inflows into SADC countries by 0.22%, 0.16% and 0.42% in models A, C and D respectively.  
Market potential measured by the GDP growth rate is insignificantly different from zero in all four 
models of Panel 4. Surprisingly, however, just as in panels 1 and 3 the variable is negatively signed. 
This finding is contrary to theory which suggests that high incomes discourage foreign capital due to 
possible competitiveness of local businesses (indicated by high incomes). 
The stock of infrastructure variable is significant in all four models of Panel 4 at 1% in Model D and at 
10% in models A, B and C. The coefficients, just as in panels 1, 2 and 3, are negatively signed. The 
coefficients indicate that a 1% increase in infrastructure stock explains reduction in net FDI inflows by 
0.69%, 0.37%, 0.79% and 0.52% in models A to D respectively. This result reinforces those findings 
in panels 1, 2 and 3. 
The log natural resources variable, unlike the results of panels 1, 2 and 3, is significant only in Model 
B at 10% level. Thus, adding South Africa to the panel of SADC countries reduces the impact of 
natural resources rents. This is because of the dominance of South Africa in terms of resource richness 
and FDI inflows compared to other SADC countries. Therefore, even though South Africa receives 
high rents from its natural resources, it continues to attract high investment inflows due to other 
advantages it has, such as high economic development. For Panel 4 Model B, a 1% increase in the 
natural resources variable reduces net FDI inflows by 0.60%. 
The trade openness variable in Panel 4 shows that the variable is insignificantly different from zero in 
all four models. The result is negatively signed as in panels 2 and 3. The sign is contrary to theory and 
means that FDI into SADC countries prefers protected economies which are not open to trade, even 
after adding South Africa to the model.  
Financial globalisation has a significantly positive impact on FDI inflows in three models of Panel 4 at 
5% level. This result complements the findings of panels 1, 2 and 3. A 1% increase in financial 
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globalisation increases net FDI inflows by 0.83%, 1.22% and 0.58% in models A, C and D 
respectively. This result suggests that financial development is important to foreign investment in the 
SADC. 
The economic policy variable is insignificant in all four models of Panel 4. Similar to panels 1 and 3, 
the variable is negatively signed in all the models. This reinforces the argument that government 
expenditure crowds out foreign investment and inflation levels in the SADC are too high which affects 
business viability. 
 
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This study has investigated the effectiveness of tax incentives (tax holidays, corporate income tax 
(CIT), reduced CIT in specific sectors and losses carried forward) in attracting FDI. The study further 
grouped SADC countries into four panels. Panel 1 included the seven highest resource-rich countries, 
Panel 2 had the six least resource-rich countries, Panel 3 consisted of twelve SADC countries 
excluding South Africa which is an outlier in resource richness and growth and Panel 4 had all thirteen 
SADC countries in the study. In line with the existing theoretical framework, the impact of tax 
incentives on FDI was estimated taking into account the contemporaneous effects of market size, 
governance, physical infrastructure, natural resource endowments, trade openness, financial 
globalisation and economic policy. The estimations were carried out using the SYS GMM estimation 
technique. 
The estimations revealed interesting results on the effectiveness of tax incentives in FDI attraction in 
the SADC region. The tax incentive variables indicate that only CIT is statistically different from zero 
in the entire four panels estimated in the study and it constituted Model B. Consistent with theory, the 
CIT variable renders results which are negatively signed. Thus, it can be concluded that in SADC 
countries, increasing statutory CIT, reduces the attractiveness of a country to foreign capital. Tax 
holidays had mixed and interesting results in all four panels. The variable significantly explains 
variations in FDI inflows only in Panel 2 which comprises the resources-poorer SADC countries. The 
effect of the variable is positive in Panel 2, thus for the resources-poorer SADC countries, increasing 
tax holidays attracts more foreign capital. Though insignificant in Panel 3, the variable has a positive 
effect, but surprisingly in panels 1 and 4, tax holidays show a negative effect. This indicates that 
adding South Africa to the set of all SADC countries listed in the study, changes the effect of tax 
holidays. This then shows that for transitional economies in the group (including South Africa) tax 
holidays discourage foreign capital. 
Losses carried forward are insignificant but positively signed in panels 2, 3 and 4 and negatively 
signed in Panel 1 of the study. The positive sign indicates that FDI in the SADC prefers longer losses 
carried forward. Reduced CIT shows a significant negative effect in Panel 1. This indicates that 
increasing taxes in specific sectors affects overall FDI inflows in the SADC. Contrary to Panel 1, 
Panel 2 shows reduced CIT to be significantly positive for explaining FDI inflows into SADC 
resources-poorer countries. The variable, though insignificant in panels 3 and 4, has a negative sign. 
From the above summarised findings, the study recommends that the SADC pursue policies that 
increase domestic effective demand and ensure a stable market for products, in order to lure more FDI 
inflows. The study gave the policy recommendations based on empirical findings specific to the 
SADC. Firstly, the study recommends that SADC countries administer low CIT to encourage FDI 
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inflows. Secondly, for resources-rich countries tax holidays should not be granted as they discourage 
FDI inflows; however, resources-poor countries can implement tax holidays as they attract investment 
in the countries. 
Thirdly, lowering taxes in specific sectors that are important to economic growth should be pursued by 
the SADC governments as this encourages FDI inflows. Fourthly, the SADC countries should 
establish policies that ensure openness to FDI since flows of FDI into SADC countries are related to 
previous year FDI inflows. Fifthly, good governance is crucial in the SADC as it encourages new 
investments and reinvestments by existing investors. The next point is that, infrastructure should be 
consistently improved to suit all types of investment. This demands that the SADC countries move 
away from improving infrastructure that only favours primary resource investment. This is because 
natural resources are non-renewable and once depleted, will no longer attract FDI.  
Lastly, SADC countries should improve its nationals’ accessibility to financial resources as this will 
attract more investors. 
 
5. References 
Akanbi, O.A. (2013). Does governance matter in infrastructure? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. International Business 
and Economics Journal, Vol. 12(1), pp. 113-126. 
Akanbi, O.A. (2015). Structural and institutional determinants of poverty in Sub-Saharan African countries. Journal of 
Human Development and Capabilities: A Multi-Disciplinary Journal for People-Centered Development, Vol 16(1), pp. 122-
141.  
Akrami, F. (2008). Foreign direct investment in developing countries: impact on distribution and employment: a historical, 
theoretical and empirical study. PhD Thesis. University of Fribourg Switzerland. 
Anyanwu, J. (2011). Determinants of FDI flows to Africa, 1980-2007. Tunis: African Development Bank Group. Working 
Paper Series, No. 136, Tunisia. 
Baltagi, B. (2005). Econometric analysis of panel data. England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Bellak, C. & Leibrecht, M. (2005). Do low corporate income tax rates attract FDI? Evidence from Eight Central and East 
European Countries. University of Nottingham. 
Blundell, R. & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 87(1), pp. 115-143.  
Bolnick, B. (2004). Effectiveness and economic impact of tax incentives in the SADC Region. Gaborone: SADC Tax 
Subcommittee, SADC Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Directorate. 
Calderón, C. & Servén, L. (2004). The effects of infrastructure development on growth and income distribution. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper Series. World Bank. 
Calderón, C. & Servén, L. (2010). Infrastructure in Latin America. Policy research working paper, World Bank. 
Calitz, E.; Wallace, S. & Burrows, L. (2013). The impact of tax incentives to stimulate investment in South Africa. 
Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 19/13. 
Chai, J. & Goyal, R. (2008). Tax concessions and foreign direct investment in the Eastern Caribbean currency union. IMF 
Working Paper 08/257, Washington D.C: International Monetary Fund. 
Chavali, S. (2014). Investment, exchange rates and relative prices: evidence from emerging economies. Glasgow: PhD thesis. 
Glasgow Theses Service, University of Glasgow. 
Dadzie, S. (2012). Foreign direct investment strategies and performance of foreign subsidiaries in Ghana. PhD thesis, 
Business Administration and Marketing, Universitas Wasaensis. 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                                          J A M  v o l .  7 ,  n o .  3 ( 2 0 1 7 )  
 
57 
Devarajan, S.; Swaroop, V. & Zou, H. (1996). The composition o public expenditure and economic growth. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, pp. 313-344. 
Dunning, J.H. (1979). Explaining changing patterns of international production: in defence of the eclectic theory. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics & Statistics, Vol. 41, pp. 269-95. 
Dunning, J.H. (1988). The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement and possible extensions. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 19, pp. 1-32. 
Dunning, J.H. (1993). Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
Dunning, J.H. & Lundan, S. (2008). Multinational enterprise and the global economy. Massachusetts, USA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited. 
Fedderke, J. & Romm, A. (2006). Growth impact and determinants of foreign direct investment into South Africa, 1956-
2003. Economic Modeling, Vol. 23, pp. 738-760. 
Hassett, K.A. & Habbard, R.G. (2002). Tax policy and business investment. In Feldstein, Auerbach & Martin, (Eds.). 
Handbook of Public Economics. Netherlands: Elsevier Science B.V. 
Holland, D. & Vann, R. (1998). Tax law design and drafting, Vol. 2; IMF: 1998, V. Thuroyi, (ed.). Income tax incentives for 
investment, pp. 789-867. 
Kaufmann, D.; Kraay, A. & Matstruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and analytical 
issues. Draft working paper. 
Kinda, T. (2014). The quest for non-resource-based foreign direct investment: do taxes matter? Washington, D.C: IMF 
working paper.  
Kirkpatrick, C.; Parker, D. & Zhang, Y. (2006). Foreign direct investment in infrastructure in developing countries: Does 
regulation make a difference? Transnational Corporations, Vol. 15, pp. 143-172. 
Klemm, A. (2009). Causes, benefits, and risks of business tax incentives. Washington, DC: IMF Working Paper, Fiscal 
Affairs Department. 
Klemm, A. & Van Parys, S. (2009). Empirical evidence on the effects of tax incentives. IMF Working Paper. 
Mateev, M. (2008). Determinants of  foreign direct investment in Central and South Eastern Europe: new empirical tests. 8th 
Global Conference on Business and Economics. Florence, Italy. 
Muradzikwa, S. (2002). Foreign investment in SADC. Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 02/67. Available 
online: http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/dru, Accessed on 29/07/2012. 
OECD. (2001). Corporate tax incentives for foreign direct investment. Paris: OECD publications service. 
Ojeaga, P. (2012). Export oriented growth and poverty alleviation: understanding the effects of aid, economic policy and 
liberalisation reforms on the African economy. PhD thesis. Italy: University of Bergamo, Department of Economics and 
Industrial Organisation. 
Okodua, H. (2011). Migrant workers' remittances and output growth in Sub-Saharan African countries. European Scientific 
Journal, Vol. 8(19), pp. 142-163. 
Onyeiwu, S. & Shrestha, H. (2005). Tax incentives and foreign direct investment in the MENA region. Cairo, Egypt: 12th 
Annual conference of the Economic Research Forum. 
Porter, M.E. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. New York: Free Press. 
Robinson, Z. (2005). The determinants of corporate taxation in the SADC region: future fiscal challanges. South African 
Reserve Bank Working Paper. 
Sato, T. (2012). Empirical analysis of corporate tax and foreign direct investment. Tokyo, Japan: Policy Research Institute, 
Ministry of Finance. Public Policy Review, Vol. 8(1), pp. 1-20. 
Šimović, H. & Žaja, M. (2010). Tax incentives in Western Balkan countries. World Academy of Science, Engineering and 
Technology International. Journal of Social, Business, Psychological, Human Science and Engineering, pp. 103-108. 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                                          J A M  v o l .  7 ,  n o .  3 ( 2 0 1 7 )  
 
58 
Stoianov, M. (2007). The impact of the trade and financial openness on the economic growth in the countries from the 
Eastern Europe. Dissertation paper. Bucharest: Academy of Economic Studies, Doctoral School of Finance and Banking. 
Sudsawasd, S. (2008). Taxation, business regulation, and foreign direct investment in East Asia. In H. Soesastro, (Ed.). 
Deepening economic integration-The ASEAN economic community and beyond. Chiba IDE-JETRO: ERIA Research Project 
Report, pp. 239-265. 
Tiebout (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, pp. 416-424. 
Word Bank (2004). Pattern of Africa-Asia trade and investment: potential for ownership and partnership. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Wilson, J. (1999). Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal, Vol. 52(2), pp. 269-304. 
Zee, H.; Stosky, J. & Ley, E. (2002). Tax incentives for business investment: a primer for policy makers in developing 
countries. World Development, Vol. 30, pp. 1497-1516. 
 
Appendix 
Table A1. Construction of infrastructure index 
Method of construction 
variables 
PCA 
Component 1 
PCA  
Component 2 
PCA  
Component 3 
Telephone 
Electricity 
Internet 
0.6797 
0.2264 
0.6976 
-0.2423 
0.9671 
-0.0778 
0.6923 
0.1161 
-0.7122 
Notes: The table values were constructed using the eigenvalue transformation.  
The infrastructure index was constructed from the principal component eigenvalue (Table 10 above). 
Using the stata command ―predict pc1 pc2 pc3‖ the principal components are generated from the 
equations: 
     
     
     ernetyelectricittelephonePC
ernetyelectricittelephonePC
ernetyelectricittelephonePC
int*7122.0*1161.0*6923.03
int*0778.0*9671.0*2423.02
int*6976.0*2264.0*6797.01



 
PC1, PC2 and PC3 are the principal components 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
The infrastructure index was obtained by summing the principal components as infrastructure index = 
PC1+PC2+PC3. 
Table A1. Construction of economic policy index using eigenvectors 
Method of construction Variables PCA 
Component 1 
PCA 
Component 2 
Government expenditure 
Inflation 
-0.7071 
 0.7071 
0.7071 
0.7071 
Source: Generated by author using eigenvalue transformation, using the command “pca government inflation”. 
The economic policy index is constructed from the principal component eigenvalue Table 11 above. 
Using the stata command ―predict pc4 pc5‖ principal components are generated from the equations: 
   
   lgvtPC
lgvtPC
inf*7071.0exp*7071.05
inf*7071.0exp*7071.04


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Where gvtexp is government expenditure and infl is inflation. PC4 and PC5 are the principal 
components 1 and 2 respectively. 
The economic policy index is obtained by summing the principal components as economic policy 
index = PC4+PC5. 
Table A3. Panel 1 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument  
Count 
58 58 58 58 
F(stat) Wald 
2
 
321.10 315.90 313.21 335.96 
F(stat) p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test  
p-values 
(0.4380) (0.5113)  (0.5315) (0.5641) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.1335) 
(0.1363) 
(0.1539) 
(0.1432) 
(0.1276) 
(0.1234) 
(0.0697) 
(0.0897) 
Table A4. Panel 2 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument Count 55 55 55 55 
F(stat) Wald 
2
 
165.06 171.17 173.54 179.21 
F(stat) p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test  
p-values 
(0.7158) (0.6907)  (0.6406) (0.7271) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.0937) 
(0.0983) 
(0.0763) 
(0.0765) 
(0.0827) 
(0.0926) 
(0.0761) 
(0.0973) 
Table A5. Panel 3 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument Count 60 167 163 166 
F(stat) Wald 
2
 
323.35 862.35 810.53 837.35 
F(stat) p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test p-values (0.4508) (0.2648) (0.3954) (0.2438) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.1230) 
(0.1264) 
(0.1342) 
(0.1437) 
(0.1209) 
(0.1318) 
(0.1386) 
(0.1425) 
Table A6. Panel 4 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument Count 174 175 172 175 
F(stat) Wald 
2
 
853.31 890.50 831.67 876.58 
F(stat) p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test p-values (0.3074) (0.1654)  (0.2775) (0.1415) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.1672) 
(0.1724) 
(0.1549) 
(0.1690) 
(0.1452) 
(0.1524) 
(0.1673) 
(0.1739) 
 
